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SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT: A
"Virtually Identical" "Look and Feel"? Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994)
Rodger R. Colet
After nearly seven years,1 the Apple-Microsoft litigation over
personal computer graphic user interfaces came to an end in February
1995 when the Supreme Court denied certiorari to Apple in the Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation decision of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit.2 The decision provides another factual
example for attorneys seeking insight into the analysis of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on copyright issues relating to 'substan-
tial similarity' and 'look and feel'. After Apple Computer, if a claim
for copyright protection is based on the "look and feel" of individual
unprotected elements of expression, the protection given the copyright
is "thin" and infringement will be found only if the two expressions
are "virtually identical."3 The Ninth Circuit held that the district court
had "properly identified the sources of similarity . . ., determined
which were licensed, distinguished ideas from expression, and decided
the scope of Apple's copyright by dissecting the unauthorized expres-
sion and filtering out unprotectable elements" and "correctly con-
cluded that iUicit copying could occur only if the works as a whole are
virtually identical."4
I. BACKGROUND
The Apple Macintosh's graphic user interface was responsible
for much of the commercial success of that computer in the 1980s.'
After the release of Microsoft Windows 1.0 in 1985, Apple notified
Microsoft of its belief that Windows 1.0 infringed Apple's audiovisual
Copyright @ 1995 by Rodger R. Cole.
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1. Apple Computer, Inc. ("Apple') filed the copyright infringement suit against Microsoft
Corporation ("Microsoft") and Hewlett-Packard Company ("HP") on March 17, 1988. Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1015 (N.D.Cal. 1992) [Apple V].
2. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
130 L. Ed. 2d 1129 (1995) [Apple Computer).
3. Id. at 1442.
4. Id. at 1447.
5. Apple I, 799 F. Supp. at 1017.
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copyrights in graphic user interfaces.6 Apple and Microsoft negoti-
ated an agreement ("1985 Agreement") that was entered into on No-
vember 22, 1985. 7 In the 1985 Agreement, Microsoft acknowledged
that the "visual displays" in Windows 1.0 were "derivative works"' of
the Apple graphic user interface. Apple granted Microsoft a non-ex-
clusive license to use the visual displays in Windows 1.0 in "present
and future software programs."9 Microsoft granted Apple a five year,
non-exclusive license to use any visual displays created by Microsoft,
while agreeing to delay the release of its Excel program for IBM com-
patible personal computers and to release an improved version of
Microsoft Word for the Macintosh. 10
After reaching the 1985 Agreement with Apple, Microsoft
granted a license to Hewlett-Packard ("HP") to use the Windows 1.0
software that eventually led to HP's New Wave software." Upon the
release of the Windows 2.03 and the New Wave software, Apple filed
the copyright infringement suit against Microsoft and HP that led to
the 1994 Ninth Circuit decision.' 2 Apple claimed infringement of
seven audiovisual copyrights 13 covering graphic user interfaces of the
Macintosh. 14
II. THE ScoPE OF THE CoPYRIGHT
To establish a copyright infringement claim, any plaintiff must
show ownership of a valid copyright and unauthorized copying of the
protected expression. Since direct evidence of copying is rare, copy-
ing can be proven circumstantially by showing access plus substantial
similarity to the infringed work.' 5 Microsoft and HP did not dispute
6. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 709 F. Supp. 925, 926 (N.D.Cal. 1989) [Ap-
pie I].
7. Id.
8. The Copyright Act defines a "derivative work" as "a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation, .... condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
9. Apple 1, 709 F. Supp. at 927.
10. Id.
11. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444, 1448 (N.D.Cal. 1991)
[Apple III]. The details of the licensing agreement between Microsoft and HP are unclear.
12. Upon the release of Windows 3.0 and New Wave 3.0 Apple filed a supplemental com-
plaint on June 28, 1991. Apple V, 799 F. Supp. at 1016. After argument on the issue, the district
court decided that the previous determinations on the scope ofprotectability would apply equally
to the supplemental complaint. Id. at 1042.
13. Audiovisual works are explicitly mentioned as the type of original authorship falling
within the scope of the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (1988).
14. Apple V, 799 F. Supp. at 1015.
15. Sid & Marty Krofft TV Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164
(9th. Cir. 1977); Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1472 (9th Cir. 1992),
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either "Apple's ownership of valid copyrights" or "access to Apple's
copyrighted works."16 The only issue for the district court was
"whether defendants' works are substantially similar in both ideas and
expression to warrant a finding of infringement."' 17
A series of decisions by the district court in response to summary
judgment motions of the parties had a decisive impact on the court's
ultimate substantial similarity analysis. In the first published decision,
the issue was whether the alleged similarities between Windows 2.03
and the Macintosh Graphical User Interface were within the scope of
the 1985 Agreement, and thus a complete defense to the infringement
claims."8 The district court interpreted the term "visual displays" in
the 1985 Agreement to mean the individual elements that existed in
Windows 1.0.19 The court found that the licensing agreement could
be a partial defense to the extent that every visual display in Windows
2.03 that was in Windows 1.0 was covered by the 1985 Agreement
and not subject to infringement claims.2 0 The license defense was
also available to HP since IHP was a licensee of Microsoft.2
This decision and the 1985 Agreement, generally, were critical to
the ultimate resolution of the substantial similarity analysis in two
ways. Specifically, since the court found most of the alleged similari-
ties in Windows 2.03 to be covered by the 1985 Agreement, these
similarities were excluded in the dissection process. 2 More generally,
the analysis of the term "visual displays" in the 1985 Agreement set a
tone of analysis for the case that remained throughout.23 The district
court's analysis consistently centered on the individual visual displays,
rather than the overall look and feel.24
The second published opinion interpreted the scope of the "visual
displays" covered in Windows 1.0 and the 1985 Agreement to ascer-
tain if, and to what extent, the 1985 Agreement licensed the visual
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 198 (1992); Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 206 (9th
Cir. 1988); Frybarger v. IBM, 812 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1987).
16. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 821 F. Supp. 616, 619 (N.D.Cal. 1993) [Ap-
ple VI].
17. Id.
18. Apple 1, 709 F. Supp. at 927.
19. Id. at 930.
20. Id. at 931-2.
21. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1428, 1434 (N.D.Cal. 1989)
[Apple II]. See also Apple V 821 F. Supp. at 627.
22. Apple 11, 717 F. Supp. at 1432.
23. Apple 111, 759 F. Supp. at 1449. "The first two published opinions were rendered by
Hon. William S. Schwarzer; after his appointment as Director of the Federal Judicial Center, this
matter was reassigned to the calendar of Hon. Vaughn R. Walker." Apple Computer, 35 F.3d at
1438 n.2.
24. Apple III, 759 F. Supp. at 1449.
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displays in Windows 2.03.25 The court made two important findings.
First, anything covered by the 1985 Agreement was going to be ex-
cluded in the analytical dissection process. "[W]here a work includes
licensed features as well as unlicensed features, infringement depends
on whether the unlicensed features are entitled to protection; licensed
features are treated as being in the public domain."26
The second critical finding of the court was that the 1985 Agree-
ment licensed everything in Windows 2.03 "except for those relating
to the use of overlapping main application windows, as opposed to
tiled main application windows, and except for the specified changes
in the appearance and manipulation of icons."27 This drastically lim-
ited the amount of copyrightable expression Apple could claim in the
substantial similarity analysis. At this point, the district court ex-
pected to "determine whether the use of those unlicensed visual dis-
plays infringes Apple's audiovisual copyrights."'28
In the course of the litigation Apple hit another stumbling block.
Apple moved for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of
fraud on the Copyright Office raised by HP and the affirmative de-
fense of lack of originality raised by Microsoft and HP. 29 HP alleged
that Apple failed to disclose pre-existing works to the Copyright Of-
fice. Specifically, HP alleged that Apple failed to disclose visits to
Xerox Corporation's Palo Alto Research Center that provided expo-
sure to pre-existing work on graphic user interfaces. 30 Although HP
showed that "the Apple Lisa/Macintosh graphic user interface was
strongly influenced by the Xerox programs, Smalltalk and Star"3' the
court found that HP had failed to establish an intent on Apple's part to
perpetrate fraud on the Copyright Office.32
The court also found in Apple's favor on the issue of originality.
Despite any previous knowledge of Xerox's work, the court found that
Apple's Lisa and Macintosh expression fulfilled the minimal degree of
creativity to satisfy the originality requirement for the Copyright
Act.3 3 However, the court severely restricted the impact of this deci-
25. Apple 11, 717 F. Supp. at 1430.
26. Id at 1432.
27. Id. at 1435.
28. Id.
29. Apple 1lI, 759 F. Supp. at 1453.
30. Apple V, 799 F. Supp. at 1017.
31. Apple III, 759 F. Supp. at 1454.
32. Id. at 1455.
33. Id Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act only protects "original works of authorship."
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). After Justice O'Connor's opinion in Feist Publications v. Rural
Telephone Service, the originality requirement appears to be Constitutionally mandated. 499
U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
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sion on Microsoft and HP's motion to reconsider the originality af-
firmative defense. The court, in the fourth published opinion, granted
the motion to reconsider "to the extent that the lack of original expres-
sion of a component element shall be relevant to the scope of protec-
tion and substantial similarity analyses." '34 This decision turned out to
be critical for Microsoft and HP when the court performed analytic
dissection under the extrinsic test since many of the elements claimed
to be protectable by Apple were found to lack originality.35
III. SUBSTANTIAL SIMIARITY IN TIM Nrh CIRCUIT
The determination that two works are substantially similar is a
difficult one.36 Historically, the Ninth Circuit struggled with the ques-
tion of when there was copying of protectable expression of an idea as
opposed to copying of an unprotected idea itself.3" "'No one in-
fringes, unless he descends so far into what is concrete [in a work] as
to invade... [its] expression.' (Cite omitted.) Only this expression
may be protected and only it may be infringed." 38 It took a contro-
versy that only Mayor McCheese could stir up for the Ninth Circuit to
spell out the extrinsic-intrinsic analysis of substantial similarity in Sid
& Marty Krofft TV Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corporation.39
Referring to Judge Learned Hand's "abstraction test"40 the court
felt that "two steps in the analytic process are implied by the require-
ment of substantial similarity."41 The first is an analysis of whether
there is substantial similarity in the ideas of the works - the extrinsic
test.42 "It is extrinsic because it depends ... on specific criteria which
can be listed and analyzed. Such criteria include the type of artwork
involved, the materials used, the subject matter, and the setting
for the subject .... [A]nalytic dissection and expert testimony are
appropriate. 43
34. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 779 F. Supp. 133, 135 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
[Apple IV].
35. See Apple V, 799 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
36. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1162. The question of "substantially" has been one that has been
open to wide interpretations in the past.
37. Id. at 1163.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1166. The Krofft case was initiated upon McDonald's use of characters in their
advertising campaigns that were ultimately found to infringe upon the copyrights of several
characters developed by the Kroffts.
40. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2nd Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 902 (1931).
41. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1163-4.
42. Id. at 1164. "The test for similarity of ideas is still a factual one, to be decided by the
trier of fact... [However], this question may often be decided as a matter of law." Id.
43. Id.
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The second step is a determination of whether there is substantial
similarity in the form of the expression in the work - the intrinsic
test.' Analytic dissection and expert testimony are not relevant to the
intrinsic test because the determination of substantial similarity under
the intrinsic test is "the response of the ordinary reasonable person. '4 5
This determination is "necessarily more subtle and complex." '46 The
Ninth Circuit believed this two-part analysis of substantial similarity is
parallel to the copying-illicit copying analysis of the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.4'
The Ninth Circuit has had the opportunity to apply the extrinsic-
intrinsic analysis to computer interfaces several times. Two such ex-
amples are Frybarger v. IBM, 8 and Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx,
Inc.4 9 In both cases the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found
no copyright infringement claim could be upheld.
In Data East USA, Data East brought suit for infringement of its
game "Karate Champ" against Epyx for its game "World Karate
Championship." ° The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's find-
ing of infringement.51 The Ninth Circuit held that the fifteen features
of "Karate Champ" that the district court found to be infringed by
"World Karate Championship" were indispensable to the idea of ka-
rate itself, and subsequently not protected by the Copyright Act."
Citing Krofft, the Data East USA court set forth the level of similarity
required to find infringement when unprotectable elements of expres-
sion are alleged to be infringed: "When idea and expression coincide,
there will be protection against nothing other than identical
copying."ss
Similarly, in Frybarger the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's findings that the alleged similarities claimed were unprotect-
able. 4 Each of the similar features were found to be indispensable to
the expression, and thus not protected by the copyright laws under the
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
47. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-9 (2nd Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851
(1947).
48. 812 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1987).
49. 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988).
50. Id. at 205-6.
51. Id. at 210.
52. Id. at 209. The Copyright Act, consistently with the accepted scope of copyright laws,
expressly excludes an "idea" as being within the purview of copyright protection. 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (1988).
53. Data East USA, 862 F.2d at 209, Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1168.
54. Frybarger, 812 F.2d at 529.
[Vol. 11
APPLE COMPUTE? v. MCROSOFT
scenes-a-faire doctrine.55 The Ninth Circuit dispensed of the substan-
tial similarity claims by citing Krofft for the standard that "indispensa-
ble expression of... ideas... may be protected only against virtually
identical copying. '56 Because no reasonable jury could conclude that
the expression was virtually identical, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
lower court's granting summary judgment. 57
Cases like these eventually led the Ninth Circuit to explicitly
state that the extrinsic test had evolved to involve an analysis of both
the substantial similarity between ideas of the works and an analysis
of the protectable expression of the Work alleged to be infringed. In
Brown Bag, Brown Bag Corporation sued Symantee Corporation for
copyright infringement of a software outlining program. The district
court analyzed the alleged similarities of the two works under the ex-
trinsic test and determined that the similarities were either not pro-
tected by copyright laws or were properly licensed. 9 On appeal
Brown Bag argued that this was improper dissection under the extrin-
sic test. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with Brown Bag's argument.6"
The Ninth Circuit expressly acknowledged the "evolution" of the ex-
trinsic test to analyze both ideas and expression.61 There are two is-
sues to be determined under the extrinsic test's analytical dissection:
the alleged substantial similarity between the ideas in the expression
and the protectability of that expression.62 The second issue has "the
purpose of defining the scope of plaintiff's copyright."63 If the
claimed expression is not protectable, the scope of the copyright is
limited accordingly. 64
The question Brown Bag did not explicitly answer, but previous
cases such as Frybarger and Data East USA had hinted at, was the
impact that limiting the scope of the copyright had on the analysis
under the intrinsic test.65 This question was answered in Apple Com-
puter. When the copyright claimed is subjected to dissection under
the extrinsic test and the analytic dissection has led to the conclusion
55. Id. at 530.
56. Id.
57. Id.




62. Id. at 1475-6.
63. Brown Bag, 960 F.2d at 1476.
64. Id.
65. Id. Brown Bag argued on appeal that the district court had not performed, or ne-
glected, the intrinsic analysis of the overall look and feel of the programs. The Ninth Circuit did
not address the issue because the record reflected that Brown Bag's counsel had never made any
such request of the district court. Id.
1995]
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that the individual elements of expression claimed are not protected by
copyright laws, the protection given the overall look and feel of the
expression is thin and in order to find infringement the works must be
virtually identical.66
IV. DIsSECnNG .4PPE CoMPU=RE
The beginning of the dissection of Apple's copyrights came long
before the district court officially embarked upon any substantial simi-
larity analyses. When determining the scope of the 1985 Agreement,
the court requested Apple to submit a list of alleged similarities. Ap-
ple produced a list of 189 similarities with Windows 2.03 and 147
similarities with New Wave 2.0.67 The district court found that 179 of
the 189 similarities with Windows 2.03 and 93 of the 147 similarities
with New Wave 2.0 were licensed by the 1985 Agreement. 8
Following lengthy discovery, there was "a deluge of summary
judgment motions: two by Apple, seven from Microsoft and nine by
I-IP.'"69 The district court planned on hearing arguments on the simi-
larities of the non-licensed items on Apple's list of similarities. Apple
attempted to avoid having the argument focus on a few similarities by
"[s]ticking stubbornly to a 'look and feel' or 'gestalt' theory" of the
copyright protection.7 0 After Apple did not address Microsoft and
IP's specific arguments on the unlicensed similarities that were
listed, the court went forward with the dissection and determined that
none of the ten unlicensed similarities with Windows 2.03 were pro-
tectable and only one similarity with New Wave was protectable. 7
Predictably, Apple moved for reconsideration and addressed
Microsoft and EP's arguments specifically.72
Rejecting Apple's claim of "a copyrightable arrangement - a
'look and feel' which constitutes protectable expression apart from its
individual elements" the court identified five features of the graphic
user interface to be dissected: overlapping windows, iconic represen-
tation, object opening/closing, menus, and iconic manipulation.73 The
court also analyzed the program manager, file manager, and colors
66. Apple Computer, 35 F.3d at 1447.
67. Apple V, 799 F. Supp. at 1016.
68. Id
69. Id.
70. Id. The district court appreciated Apple's "look and feel" arguments. The district
court simply did not want to consider them while analytically dissecting the similar elements
under the extrinsic test. The "look and feel" "test should be applied only after protectible expres-
sion has been identified, not before, as Apple would have this court do." Id. at 1026 n.16.
71. Id at 1016-17.
72. Apple V, 799 F. Supp. at 1017.
73. Id at 1022-24.
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and fonts in Windows 3.0 for similarities to Apple's copyrights.74 The
district court went through a lengthy dissection of each individual ele-
ment claimed within the above categories and determined that most
were either licensed, merged under the idea-expression doctrine, an
indispensable expression under the scenes afaire doctrine, unoriginal,
and/or limited by the design of the hardware.75 After subsequent ar-
guments on the remaining items whose protectability was undecided,
the court "determined that Microsoft's Windows consists only of ele-
ments that are either unprotectable, licensed, or protectible but lacking
sufficient similarity to Apple's works."76
Despite this analytical dissection of Apple's copyright claims, the
court still had to apply the intrinsic test since "works consisting
largely of uncopyrightable elements are entitled to copyright protec-
tion, but receive only limited protection."77 The limited protection
given to the copyright is application of the virtual identity standard in
the intrinsic analysis.7" The court held that when "the work is capable
of only a narrow range of expression" the virtual identity standard
should be applied.79
The district court expected to proceed with the question of
whether either the Microsoft or lHP work as a whole was virtually
identical to any of Apple's work. 0 When Microsoft and I-P mo-
tioned for summary judgment for noninfringement due to lack of vir-
tual identity, Apple did not oppose the motions and judgment was
entered in favor of Microsoft and -P.81 Apple appealed seeking re-
versal on two grounds: the 1985 Agreement should not have been a
partial defense and that the district court's dissection was incorrect in
eliminating unprotected elements from the comparison as a whole."
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the dis-
trict court that the license granted by the 1985 Agreement must be the
beginning point of the infringement analysis. 83 The Ninth Circuit also
agreed with the district court's treatment of those individual elements
that were covered by the license - "infringement will depend on
whether the unlicensed features are entitled to protection ' 84 - be-
74. Id. at 1041-1046.
75. Id. at 1026-1046.
76. Apple VI, 821 F. Supp. at 623.
77. Id.
78. Id at 625.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 631.
81. Apple Computer, 35 F.3d at 1438.
82. Id. at 1438-39.
83. Id. at 1440.
84. Id. at 1441.
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cause Apple was required to prove unauthorized, unlicensed expres-
sion was copied.85
The Ninth Circuit read Apple's second argument on appeal con-
sistently with the interpretation of the district court: "Apple wants an
overall comparison of its works to the accused works for substantial
similarity rather than virtual identity."86 In rejecting Apple's claims,
the Ninth Circuit approved of the lower court's handling of the extrin-
sic analytical dissection. "Because only those elements of a work that
are protectable and used without the author's permission can be com-
pared when it comes time to the ultimate question of illicit copying,
we use analytic dissection to determine the scope of copyright protec-
tion before works are considered 'as a whole' ."I'
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the findings of the district court under
the analytical dissection process. The Ninth Circuit found the district
court's filtering of elements that were licensed, merged under the idea-
expression doctrine, an indispensable expression under the scenes a
faire doctrine, unoriginal, and/or limited by the hardware process was
a proper dissection of the alleged similarities. 88
The Court of Appeals also rejected Apple's argument that
graphic user interfaces were unique audiovisual works that made ana-
lytical dissection improper. The Ninth Circuit found that analytical
dissection applies equally to video games and computer interfaces as
to any other type of copyrighted work. 9
Despite the finding that the individual claimed elements were un-
protectable, this "does not mean that at the end of the day, when the
works are considered under the intrinsic test, they should not be com-
pared as a whole."9 The extrinsic test, by performing the dual role of
identifying the substantially similar ideas and determining the appro-
priate scope of copyright protection, places the intrinsic test into con-
text by providing an appropriate standard of similarity to find
infringement.91
In Apple Computer the extrinsic test's dissection led to the con-
clusion that only "Apple's unique selection and arrangement of all of
these features" was subject to protection from infringement.92 This
85. Id.
86. Apple Computer, 35 F.3d at 1442, (emphasis in original).
87. Id. at 1443.
88. Id. at 1445.
89. Id. at 1445.
90. Id. at 1446.
91. Apple Computer, 35 F.3d at 1446.
92. Id.
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limited scope of copyrightability under the extrinsic test called for the
virtual identity standard to be applied under the intrinsic test.9 3
The only question on appeal was the legal appropriateness of the
virtual identity standard, not the merits of the virtual identity judg-
ment.94 Since "Apple did not contest summary judgment under the
virtual identity standard on the merits, judgment was properly
entered. 95
V. THE APPLE COMPUTER TEST
Apple Computer provides copyright attorneys with straightfor-
ward insight into the Ninth Circuit's thinking process on substantial
similarity. The Ninth Circuit set forth the steps it finds helpful in ana-
lyzing copyright cases "applying well-settled principles."96 First, the
"plaintiff must identify the source(s) of the alleged similarity between
his work and the defendant's work."97 Second, using analytic dissec-
tion, the trial court must determine if any of the alleged similarities are
subject to copyright protection.98 As in the Apple Computer case, any
elements which are not subject to copyright protection must be identi-
fied separately from those aspects that may be subject to copyright
laws (e.g., any authorized copying, unprotectable ideas, or indispensa-
ble expression).
Third, "[h]aving dissected the alleged similarities and considered
the range of possible expression, the court must define the scope of the
plaintiff's copyright - that is, decide whether the work is entitled to
'broad' or 'thin' protection."99 After defining the scope of the copy-
right in issue, the court can determine "the appropriate standard for a
subjective comparison of the works" under the intrinsic test to ascer-
tain if "they are sufficiently similar to support a finding of illicit
copying."100
VI. CONCLUSION
While Apple may not have been pleased with the decision, and
may be even less pleased with the decision to appeal and the subse-
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1439 n.7.
95. Id. at 1447.
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quent remand,10 the decision sends the signal to Silicon Valley and
others that the trend toward compatibility may not be stopped by the
copyright laws. As hardware, software, and interfaces in general be-
come more compatible, more expression will be deemed unoriginal or
indispensable, and there will be less copyrightable expression.
When Apple initially filed this lawsuit against Microsoft and HP,
many copyright attorneys thought the stage was set for a definitive
ruling on the status of "look and feel" claims similar to those in the
heyday of "look and feel" with Roth Greeting Cards. °2 The three
parties had enough money and motivation to see the lawsuit through to
the end, which they did. However, the 1985 Agreement and the reve-
lation of Apple's access to pre-existing Xerox material substantially
limited the material Apple could claim was protected by their audiovi-
sual copyrights. As a result, the full context of a "look and feel" claim
may not have yet been explored in the Ninth Circuit. However, Apple
Computer has filled in another piece of the substantial similarity puz-
zle: If the copyright claim is based on the "look and feel" of the ar-
rangement of unprotected components, the protection afforded the
copyright is "thin" and to show infringement the copyright holder
must show that the works are "virtually identical" to the reasonable
person under the intrinsic test."°3
101. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for a rehearing on
whether Microsoft and HP were entitled to attorney's fees as a "prevailing party" under 17
U.S.C. § 505 in light of standard announced in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1033
(1994), during the pendency of the appeal.
102. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970).
103. Apple Computer, 35 F.3d at 1447.
[Vol. 11
